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Abstract
We argue th a t traditional approaches to  natural language suffer 
from the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’. Because ‘language’ is 
a noun, and nouns usually refer to  ‘things’, it is often assumed tha t 
language is some ‘thing’ with a certain immutable structure and 
properties. This problem of language modelling is also witnessed 
by the limited success of phrase structure-based parsers in natural 
language processing. One reason for this lies in the rigidity of hier­
archical structure on the one hand, as opposed to  the high flexibility 
of language use on the other.
It will be argued th a t language is in the first place a process, and 
th a t this assumption puts the task of an analysis of language in a 
different perspective. A model supporting this view is Natural Lan­
guage Concept Analysis (NLCA). In NLCA, hierarchical structure 
is found as the result of the interaction of different, inherent combi­
natorial properties of linguistic units. The purpose of the paper is 
to  show th a t NLCA is consistent with C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic, evo­
lutionary and semeiotic approach, and th a t such approach supports 
and clarifies NLCA.
1 Introduction
In this paper, it will be argued that an adequate analysis of natural lan­
guage requires a change of perspective regarding the nature of language, 
and tha t this change of perspective in turn  requires a change of ontological 
perspective. A paradigmatic new perspective has also been encouraged 
by the limited success of traditional approaches in natural language pro­
cessing (e.g. [Hae91], [PS94], [Lam88]). In such approaches some form 
of hierarchical structure (e.g. phrase structure) plays a central role. One
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reason for the relative lack of success with rule-based parsers is due to 
the discrepancy between the rigidity of hierarchical structure and the high 
flexibility of language use. The growing realisation of this problem has 
inspired a search for alternative methods, such as statistical-based and 
lexicon-driven parsing.
Natural Language Concept Analysis (NLCA) introduced in [KS98] 
takes a different approach in which hierarchical structure is found to be 
the result of the interaction of different, inherent combinatorial properties 
of linguistic units.
The first part of this paper is an attem pt to offer a Peircean expla­
nation of the NLCA-approach. More specifically, we would like to show 
how Peirce’s categoreal and semeiotic approach may provide a theoreti­
cal framework tha t is consistent with and supportive of NLCA. After a 
brief exposition of the thesis that existing approaches to language tac­
itly suppose a substantialist ontology, we briefly state the conditions that 
are necessary to an adequate approach of language. This is followed by 
an attem pt to show that Peirce’s categoreal scheme meets those require­
ments, provided it is complemented by a Peircean theory of signs. In the 
last section of this first part, an attem pt is made at providing a Peircean 
interpretation of syntax which is consistent with the basic insights of 
NLCA.
The focus of the second part is directed to NLCA itself. First, rela­
tion schemes implementing the Peircean semeiotic view of language are 
described. This is followed by a section devoted to the algorithmic and 
representational aspects of NLCA; the section is completed by an exam­
ple. We end the paper by discussing the question how the results of an 
analysis in NLCA can be represented as conceptual structures.
2 The fallacy of misplaced concreteness
Linguistics has its origin in Greek and Medieval tradition. The basic 
presupposition of tha t tradition is that everything is to be explained in 
terms of things (substances) and their properties: not only qualities and 
quantities, but also action and passion are real by virtue of their being 
attributed to substantial entities. This position which was first explicitly 
stated by Aristotle was derived from an ingenious analysis of the Greek 
language, in which every well-formed sentence seems to consist of a ref­
erence to something of which something else is said. Indeed, Aristotle 
([Ari84a]) defined a substance as something of which many things can be 
said, but which itself can never be said of another thing. In other words,
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substance is whatever can never function as a predicate.
It soon appeared, however, tha t a number of phenomena could not 
be described either in terms of things nor in terms of properties. But 
because they were signified by (substantial) nouns, those phenomena were 
approached as if they were things, as quasi-things. Such was the case of, 
for instance, nature, cause, life, truth, and language. Thus, from the fact 
tha t language is a noun, it is usually inferred tha t it must be seen as 
a quasi-thing with certain properties. A.N. W hitehead ([Whi85]) used 
the expression “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness” to designate the 
-  usually unnoticed -  mistake of treating what is not a concrete entity 
as if it were a concrete entity. In as much as language was studied as a 
quasi-thing while it is not, it may be said tha t the traditional approach of 
language suffers from the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. In the case 
of language, the fallacy consists in attributing to language an immutable 
and universally valid structure.
Another aspect of the traditional approach, is tha t it is ambiguous 
regarding the natural status of language. On the one hand, it is gen­
erally considered to be a natural phenomenon, on the other hand, it is 
considered as something intrinsically human. Indeed, Aristotle ([Ari84b]) 
would define the human being as £wov Xoyov e$ov, an animal with the par­
ticular characteristic of having the ability of collecting (literally, reading) 
elements which by themselves have no meaning into a meaningful whole. 
Hence, Xoyoc is not only a word, but also a sentence, language as a whole, 
a reasoning, a discourse, and even reason. Thus, the profound ambiguity 
of man’s position consists in the fact tha t his nature is to be rational. If 
anything, this ambiguous stance has only increased since Darwin made it 
clear tha t we are more natural than we ever thought we were. The more 
we teach tha t we are issued from a long evolutionary process, the more 
we proclaim our status as extraordinary animals, endowed with reason.
If we return to the substantialist account of language, either as a 
collection of symbols, or as a system of sounds, it would seem rather 
obvious tha t it is falsified by the most elementary observation of language. 
Indeed, language appears in our experience primarily as a process, a term 
which, though it did occur in Greek and Latin terminology, never entered 
into philosophical discourse as a fundamental concept, except in the neo- 
Platonic doctrine ([Plo51]) where it was used to describe how Absolute 
Unity revealed itself in a procession of succeeding layers of multiplicity.
Far from being a quasi-substance, language appears only as a form 
of interaction, whether we speak it, write it, or read it. Moreover, this 
process cannot be separated from the process of learning the skill of in­
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teracting linguistically with others or with ourselves. Though the skill 
is the very condition of the process of language, it nevertheless develops 
itself within the course of the process of linguistic interaction.
The basic reason for the discrepancy between the received view and 
the observed phenomena may be traced to the ontological perspective 
which gave rise to the substantialist view of the world. This perspective 
was born from what we call the 3-P dogma (after the three initials of, 
respectively, Pythagoras, Parmenides and Plato), according to which the 
really real which hides itself behind the phenomena is immutable and 
therefore static. This static view has been kept alive along two different, 
and mutually exclusive channels. According to the first of these channels 
the ultimate reality of substances is traced to their form; according to 
the second of these channels the ultimate reality of facts is traced to their 
formulas (e.g. structure).
In as much as language is a process, any attem pt at an adequate 
analysis of tha t process must start from a rejection of the substantialist 
ontology, and a respect for the main features of processes. It will be 
argued that C.S. Peirce provided a framework which does justice to those 
features.
3 Process and categories
3.1 P eirce’s Categories
In its mature form, Peirce’s doctrine of categories ([Pei35]) states that 
all phenomena present three aspects which, though irreducible to one an­
other, have a different degree of dependency. The aspect of firstness is 
the aspect in virtue of which each phenomenon has an absolutely novel 
quality, unrelated to anything whatever. The aspect of secondness is the 
aspect in virtue of which each phenomenon involves an interaction. The 
aspect of thirdness is the aspect in virtue of which each phenomenon 
involves some habit (lawfulness, reasonableness, meaning etc.). Though 
secondness cannot be reduced to firstness, it presupposes firstness, and, 
similarly, though thirdness cannot be reduced to either firstness or sec­
ondness, it presupposes both firstness (through secondness) and second­
ness. Conversely, the element of firstness remains a mere possible, unless 
it be actualised by some interaction; and the element of secondness re­
mains brutal interaction unless it derives its meaning from thirdness. The 
important point here is tha t the categories are related to each other ac­
cording to a relation of subservience. The paradox of this relationship is
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that, though thirdness (which is more complex than either secondness or 
firstness) nevertheless needs the relatively lesser significance of firstness 
and secondness. Thus, the categories must always be considered not only 
in themselves, but as they are relative to one another. This is even the 
case for firstness which, by definition, is unrelated to anything else. But 
this unrelatedness makes it a pure potential which needs a relation to a 
second in order to be discerned as a first.
3.2 E ven ts  an d  processes
Events are interactions. In terms of Peirce’s categories, they represent 
the category of secondness ([Deb98]). But the mere fact that something 
happens says nothing whatever about what happens. The latter aspect 
is the aspect of thirdness. What happens in an event requires that the 
event be embedded in a context of events which are related to each other. 
Such web of related events is what is called a process.
3.3 Sym bols, even ts an d  processes
Language consists of symbols. According to Peirce, symbols, share with 
icons and indices the structure of a sign. Every sign is constituted by 
the triadic relation between the sign itself ([Pei35]), its object and its 
interpretant. Because signs are generated from signs, and in turn gener­
ate other signs, every sign must be an event. From this it follows that 
language consists of sign-events which, by virtue of their intepretants, are 
embedded within a process.
4 Language and ontological perspective
According to the received view, language is a tool for communication. 
Moreover, the tool is more or less ready made and is used by people 
according to some rules, some of which are semantic (use the right lexi­
cal items to adequately reach the goal intended) and some of which are 
syntactic (use the lexical items according to certain rules).
According to the process view of the world, language is a process 
rather than a tool used by people. Moreover, people and the things 
which constitute the world are abstractions from processes. Language as 
a process is generated by symbol-events which are themselves generated 
according to rules which, in Peircean terms, are habits evolving from in­
teraction with other processes. Language processes involve both syntactic 
and semantic rules or habit.
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Linguistic symbols may be considered as gesture-events within a pro­
cess of interactive responses. Syntactic symbols may be considered from 
two angles: the messenger and the receiver. From the point of view of 
the messenger, a syntactic symbol is a gesture announcing other gestures 
to be generated in view of the interpretant of the entire unit of mean­
ing (e.g. a sentence). From the point of view of the receiver, a syntactic 
symbol-event elicits an abduction regarding a range of possible subsequent 
symbol-events. Thus, the symbol-event ‘the’ elicits an indefinitely large 
field of possible subsequent symbol-events, but excludes, for instance, the 
possibility of the next symbol-event being ‘slept’.
Though Peirce distinguished different kinds of symbol-events accord­
ing to their semantic value into quali-signs, sin-signs, and legi-signs, he 
did not, at least not to our knowledge, pursue the analysis of the func­
tion of symbol-events according to their syntactic value. But there is no 
reason why this can not be done.
Indeed, from a syntactical point of view, symbol-events have a specific 
function, regardless of their semantic function. The syntactic value of the 
language symbols making up the unit of meaning may be seen in function 
of the value which they have in forming such a unit.
By virtue of their secondness, events are marked by a binary relation 
which must be reflected in symbol-events. This is why, strictly speaking, 
one lexical item by itself has no meaning. The syntactical value of symbol­
events will therefore depend upon the sort of relation that obtains between 
two language symbols. If one of the symbols has by itself no information 
content and therefore is a mere quality (a sound or a visible character), it 
will need another symbol to actualise its ‘potential’ content. Such nexus 
of two symbols, one of which has mere potential content, may be called 
a proto-symbol which corresponds to the category of firstness.
Similarly, when the nexus is constituted by an asymmetrical relation 
between one language symbol which derives its full content from its asso­
ciation with another language symbol which is in principle self-sufficient, 
it may be called a deutero-symbol which corresponds to the category of 
secondness.
Finally, when the nexus consists of a number of language symbols 
which are self-sufficient but together generate the interpretant of the unit 
formed by the string, e.g. a sentence, it will be called a trito-symbol 
which, by its aspect of thirdness, mediates between the language symbols 
constituting a unit of meaning.
To complete the picture, it is necessary to say a word about the triadic 
relation characterising each of these signs, because without such relation,
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they would not be signs, let alone syntactical signs. But precisely what 
makes then syntactical signs is the very fact that they stand for specific 
rules or habits. Thus, the object of syntactical signs is the rule for which 
they stand. Their interpretant on the other hand is the generation of the 
selection of the next symbol-event. The interpretant of the entire string of 
language symbols is, from a syntactical point of view, the establishment 
of the correctness of the string, regardless of its semantic content.
Because syntactical symbol-events stand for rules governing the rela­
tionship between two or more language symbols, the occurrence of one 
symbol will trigger the expectation of the occurrence of the other rele­
vant symbol as required by the rule in question. Such expectation which 
may be regarded as the expression of a hypothesis (which according to 
Peirce is the conclusion of an abductive inference) regarding the nature 
of the next language symbol, must obey Peirce’s principle of abduction 
([Pei35]). One of these may be called the principle of economy, which 
stipulates that all things being equal, a more plausible hypothesis must 
be tested before a less plausible one. Thus, the expectation triggered by a 
language symbol will be focused first on the occurrence of the other rele­
vant symbol as required by the rule in question. The principle of economy 
is a very important factor in the construction of well-formed strings.
5 A process semeiotic view of language
NLCA defines three relation schemes underlying hierarchy (e.g. phrase 
structure) in language: qualification, minor predication and major predi­
cation. These relation schemes concretely illustrate the Peircean approach 
and become intelligible within the Peircean perspective. Qualification, 
minor predication and major predication are implementations of proto­
symbol, deutero-symbol and trito-symbol, respectively. The process se­
meiotic approach of NLCA is also the basis of its flexibility ([KS98]). This 
aspect of NLCA, however, is beyond the scope of the paper, due to space.
5.1 R e la tio n  schem es
A qualification (Q ) consists of a qualifier and a core. The qualifier has 
no information content independent of the core; it makes the core more 
specific. For example, a Q-relation (an instance of a relation scheme is 
called a relation) can specify the referential status of NPs; tense/aspect 
in VPs. The potential content of the qualifier is modelled by a Proto­
item.; introduced for the core (in the case the qualifier precedes the core).
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When the core is realized, it replaces the Proto-item. In the relation 
between qualifier and core, the qualifier points at some qualification of 
the core, and the core fulfils the combinatorial need of the qualifier. E.g. 
the article-noun relation.
A minor predication (mp) consists of a (minor) predicate and an argu­
ment. The predicate has information content independent of its argument 
and adds new, factual information to it. The relation between minor pred­
icate and argument is asymmetric: the predicate needs its argument, but 
not the other way round (modification). The predicate points at some 
property of its argument, and the argument fills the combinatorial need 
of the predicate. E.g. the adjective-noun relation.
A major predication (MP)  consists of a predicate and its argument(s). 
Both have information content, and the relation between predicate and 
argument(s) is symmetric (each requires the presence of the other). The 
predicate introduces an argument structure, and incorporates its argu­
ments into a single relation. E.g. the verb-argument(s) relation.
The relations can be realised in language on different levels, e.g. on 
the morphological level, or on the level of syntax. This implies that 
NLCA has the potential to be language independent. At present we have 
a detailed specification of English. An NLCA application of Hungarian is 
being developed, and preliminary results indicate that our approach can 
also be applied to that language. In this paper we will restrict ourselves 
to English.
6 Evaluation principles
In NLCA the input string is analysed from left to right, and the relations 
are evaluated incrementally. A relation is evaluated when qualifier and 
core, or predicate and argument(s) bind to each other. The evaluation, 
which can be initiated by either participant in the relation, is economic, 
meaning that lexical items relate to the ‘nearest’ surrounding candidates.
This principle, called greedy binding, is restricted by the demand that 
only visible items can bind to each other. The visibility structure and 
any change to it, is due to the relations: each may introduce a new 
visibility range for itself. The creation of a new range makes an older 
range invisible, but when the new range ceases to exist, the older range 
becomes visible again. The hierarchy of ranges reflects the relation of 
subservience. In English, mp-relations do not change visibility, and this 
coincides with the optional character of modifiers (minor predicates).
A visibility range is terminated by closing (and by encountering end-
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of-sentence). This operation applied to a combination of lexical items 
can yield a single new item, called a lexical unit. (N.B. a lexical item is a 
lexical unit; the principles described above extend naturally from lexical 
items to lexical units.) The linguistic properties of a lexical unit are de­
rived from its members. Closing can be considered as an implementation 
of a property of signs that signs are generated from signs.
The object of a symbol-event is a rule. Whenever the rule is known, 
any constituent of the symbol can be used to represent it. This implies 
that in the case of closing no new item needs to be introduced, as long as 
there is no danger of ambiguity. E.g. in the case of a Q-relation, either 
of the qualifier, or of the core can represent the relation itself. We will 
make extensive use this feature in the example, in Sect. 7.
Finally, we say, the input is well-formed if the combinatorial need of 
each lexical unit is satisfied, meaning that the external argument positions 
of all items are filled (see below).
7 Towards an algorithm
Relations are represented by pointers between lexical units (in the case 
of morphological realisation, by constants). The source of a pointer is a 
lexical unit; the destination is an argument position of the related item. 
There are two internal argument positions for each lexical unit, repre­
senting information about the item itself: one for the Q- and one for the 
mp-relations, denoted by _int(q) and _int(m), respectively.
Each lexical unit has one or more external argument positions _ext, 
representing its combinatorial properties. In the case of verbs there are as 
many of such positions as there are obligatory arguments. The argument 
positions can be labelled, e.g. in the case of verbs; the labelling is defined 
by the lexicon, e.g. AGENT.
We represent the web of relations by a Relation Matrix (RM). There 
is a row allocated for each noun (a typical argument), called an object, 
and a column for each article, preposition, adjective, adverb and verb 
(typical functors), called attributes. Furthermore a column is allocated 
for each external argument position of a verb. For Proto-items a row or 
a column is allocated (referred to as Proto-object and Proto-attribute), 
depending on the qualifier introducing it. Lexical units created by closing 
are represented similarly, depending on the properties of their members. 
Internal and external argument positions of lexical items are given as 
buckets on the left and right hand side, respectively. Unfilled argument 
positions are omitted.
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The pointers between rows and columns are (conceptually) stored in 
the cells of the RM; in the examples however, they are graphically repre­
sented. Besides the pointers, a cell contains a ‘+ ’ sign if the destination 
of a pointer stored in the cell is an external argument position. These 
signs will be used as markers of the emerging phrasal structure.
All information about lexical units is contained in the lexicon, such 
as type, number and location (pre- or post-) of argument(s) etc. In the 
example below, lexical information is specified on-the-fly. The user of an 
NLCA implementation only needs to know about the relation schemes 
and NLCA’s principles, no knowledge about the algorithm or the imple­
mentation is required. This implies that in such a model of language, 
information about lexical units can be expressed in terms of familiar lin­
guistic notions.
Exam ple The lion slept in a cage.
th e  generates a column. As a qualifier, it functions as the internal ar­
gument of its core, an object. The qualifier precedes the core, therefore 
it creates a Proto-object and points at its qualifying internal argument 
position.
the —» Proto-object Jnt(q)
lion replaces the Proto-object. There is a qualifier present, hence there is 
a pointer from the noun to the external argument position of ‘the’, which 
results in a ‘+ ’ in the RM in cell lion/the. We found a noun phrase. 
Since there is not yet a pointer to the external argument position of the 
noun, we still do not have a clause.
lion ^  the.ext ‘+ ’ in RM in cell lion/the
slep t generates a column. Its qualifying internal argument is filled by 
the feature PAST; its external argument is labelled EXP. Since ‘sleep’ is 
a major predicate, it fills the external argument position of the object 
‘lion’, and ‘lion’ points to the EXP role. As a result, there is a ‘+ ’ in the 
RM in cells lion/EXP and lion/sleep. As the external argument position 
of the intransitive verb is filled, we found a clause.
sleep ^  lion_ext ‘+ ’ in RM in cell lion/EXP
lion —» sleep.ext (e x p) ‘+ ’ in RM in cell lion/sleep
in generates a column. It has an optional first, and an obligatory second 
argument. As a preposition, it invokes a MP-relation for its argu­
m ents), but when the relation is evaluated, the prepositional phrase
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(PP) invokes a mp-relation for the lexical unit it modifies (Kamphuis 
and Grootjen, personal communication, 1997). In the current example, 
the first argument is not realised, the second argument has not yet been 
encountered.
a generates a column, and a new Proto-object (cf. the treatment of ‘the’ 
above).
a —» Proto-object_int(q)
cage replaces the Proto-object (cf. the treatment of ‘lion’ above). We 
found a noun phrase which fills the external argument position of ‘in’; 
as a result, we found a prepositional phrase.
cage —» a_ext ‘+ ’ in RM in cell cage/a
cage —» in_ext ‘+ ’ in RM in cell cage/in
in —» cage_ext
No new item needs to be introduced for the PP, as the preposition 
can also represent the phrase itself. In the example, we introduce a 
new external argument position of ‘in’, labelled PP, for representing the 
combinatorial needs of the PP.
The PP forms a mp-relation with the verb. The object of the symbol­
event, ‘slept in a cage’, is the rule: there is a mp-relation between the 
constituents ‘sleep(PAST)’ and ‘in a cage’. The recursive application of 
the triadic relation to the constituent ‘in a cage’, yields the rule: there 
is a MP-relation between ‘in’ and ‘a cage’. The transitive closure of 
these relations yields the relation between ‘sleep(PAST)’ and ‘a cage’; 
this results in a ‘+ ’ in the RM in cell cage/sleep(PAST).
NLCA exploits the triadic relation for translating a relation between two 
columns of the RM, to one between row and column. Such a translation 
may be necessary when a RM is to be represented by a concept lattice 
(cf. Sect. 8).
in —» sleep_int(m) ‘+ ’ in RM in cell cage/sleep
sleep —» in_ext (p p )
The Relation Matrix for the full sentence is displayed in Fig. 1.
Going through the sentence from left to right, we see the following struc­
ture emerge:
• At word ‘lion’ we obtain the noun phrase (+i);
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f 1----- 1 ----------- 1-----------------
the, , , \ '„past sleep ,exp , inL a,
p r  t
J + l j  +3 + 2
■5 +4 ^ +6
Figure 1: The Relation Matrix for “The lion slept in a cage”.
• At word ‘slept’ we obtain the clause (+ 2  and + 3);
• At word ‘cage’ we obtain the noun phrase (+ 4), the prepositional 
phrase (+ 5), and the full clause (+a)-
8 Conceptual s truc tu res
A RM can be represented as a conceptual graph (CG) ([Sow98]). Such a 
graph may be considered as a flow-chart of the symbol-events, in terms 
of their expectation-value as, respectively, proto-, deutero- and trito- 
symbols.
For each RM, there exists an equivalent conceptual graph. We verify 
this statement by defining a mapping between RM and CG, as follows. 
A lexical unit (I) is mapped to a box labelled I. If two lexical units are 
related, then there is a pointer between the corresponding boxes, and 
the pointer contains a labelled circle. The direction of the pointer and 
the label of the circle is defined by the relation. E.g. in the case of a 
Q-relation between qualifier and core, the pointer points from qualifier 
to core, and the circle is labelled ‘q’. This pointer is the image of the 
pointers qualifier —» core_int(q) and core —» qualifer_ext.
The mapping of a mp-relation can be defined similarly. In the case of a 
MP-relation the mapping makes use of the labels of the external argument 
positions of the major predicate. For the yield of a closing operation a 
context is introduced. The mapping applied to the RM above is depicted 
in Fig. 2 (contexts are omitted).
A mapping from a RM to a concept lattice (CL) ([Wil82]) can be 
defined easily, too. It merely involves the removal of pointers in each cell 
of the RM. This may result in a loss of information, and that implies that 
the CL may only represent a RM in some respect.
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Figure 2: A conceptual graph for “The lion slept in a cage”.
The CL for our example is shown in Fig. 3. The concepts of the 
lattice correspond to relations of the RM, and interestingly, to the focus 
of WH-questions: (Cl) Who slept? (C2) Where ...? and (C3) What 
happened? This suggests a potential correspondence between question 
formation in language, and the information reflected in formal concepts. 
A (sub)lattice also has information content, e.g. C0-C1-C2-C3 represents 
the clause. The use of sublattices is potentially relevant for interpreting 
discourse relations.
C3=({lion,cage},{sleep(PAST)})
C1=({lion},{the,sleep (PAST),EXP }) C2=({cage},{sleep(PAST), in,a})
C0=({},{the,sleep (PAST),EXP, in,a})
Figure 3: The concept lattice for “The lion slept in a cage”.
9 Sum m ary
A paradigmatic new model of language, NLCA, is described. It is shown 
that NLCA is consistent with C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic, evolutionary and 
semeiotic approach, and that such approach supports and clarifies NLCA. 
Algorithmic aspects of NLCA are exemplified. The representation of an 
analysis by conceptual graph and concept lattice is discussed.
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